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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
It is the position of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") that under CWA § 509(b)(1), judicial review of the regulation at issue lies exclusively in the U.S. court of appeals. Appellants, Laconic Baykeeper, Inc., Ima Fisher, and Sam Schwimmer
("Baykeepers") and New Union Farmers Institute, Union of New
Union Pesticide Applicators, Happy Valley Farm, Inc., and Wiccillum Copters, Inc. ("Farmers"), erred in filing their original suits in
U.S. district court, thus both actions before this Court should be
dismissed with prejudice. Should this Court determine that district court jurisdiction was not improper, the Court would have
jurisdiction to hear all claims presented in this appeal. Absent a
statutory directive like that found under CWA § 509(b)(1), federal
district courts have the general authority to hear "all civil actions"
arising under the laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2007).
Federal district courts also have the authority to hear "all
other claims" that "form part of the same case or controversy." 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2007). Therefore, if district court jurisdiction was
proper, this appeal of right, timely filed by Baykeepers and Farmers, taken from a final judgment rendered in a federal court, supplies this Court with jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2007).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether Baykeepers lack standing to challenge the Pesticide Rule.
II. Whether district court jurisdiction over any challenge to
the Pesticide Rule is precluded because such challenges should
have been brought directly in the court of appeals pursuant to
CWA § 509(b)(1).
III. Whether the Court should equitably toll the 120-day statute of limitations of CWA § 509(b)(1) if it determines that these
cases should have been commenced in the court of appeals.
IV. Whether Farmers' challenge is not ripe under the doctrine of Abbott Labs. v. Gardner.
V. Whether the Pesticide Rule's exemption of specified pesticide application activities from the CWA permitting program was
in accordance with law.
VI. Whether the Pesticide Rule's exclusion from exemption of
pesticide residues, pesticides applied in violation of FIFRA requirements, and pesticides applied distant from water but which
drift into water was in accordance with law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Two groups of plaintiffs, Baykeepers and Farmers, filed separate suits in the United States District Court for the District of
New Union against defendant EPA, challenging the scope and validity of the recently-adopted rule entitled "Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA"
("Pesticide Rule"). 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122); (R. at 1, 4.) The Pesticide Rule adopted
an amendment to 40 C.F.R. § 122, adding an exemption to permitting requirements under CWA § 402 under two circumstances:
(1) where aquatic pesticides are discharged directly into water, in
compliance with pertinent Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") requirements, to kill pests that are present in water; and (2) where non-aquatic pesticides are discharged
over or near water, in compliance with pertinent FIFRA requirements, to kill pests that are present over or near water. (R. at 1-2,
4-5.) EPA designed this regulation in order to clarify their formal
interpretation of the term "pollutant" under CWA § 502(6) as it
relates to pesticides in the aforementioned circumstances. (R. at
2.) Baykeepers challenged EPA's authority to adopt any exemption from Clean Water Act ("CWA") permitting requirements for
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pesticides discharged into waters of the United States. (R. at 2.)
Farmers challenged the limited scope of the exemption, and
sought a declaration that pesticide residues, pesticides applied in
violation of FIFRA requirements, and pesticides applied distant
from water but which drift into water should all be exempted from
CWA permitting requirements as well. (R. at 2.)
The district court held that Baykeepers had standing to challenge the Pesticide Rule (R. at 9), and granted Baykeepers summary judgment in part, ruling that EPA acted contrary to the
intent of Congress when it exempted certain biological (i.e., nonchemical) pesticides and non-aquatic pesticides applied over or
near water from CWA permitting requirements. (R. at 2.)
Baykeepers appealed the district court's ruling, which upheld the
validity of the Pesticide Rule in regards to chemical pesticides. (R.
at 2, 13.) The district court held that Farmers had standing to
challenge the Pesticide Rule, but further held that Farmers' challenge was not sufficiently ripe for judicial review. (R. at 5, 10.)
Thus, the district court did not consider the merits of Farmers'
challenge, and instead granted summary judgment against Farmers, which Farmers then appealed. (R. at 2, 10-11.) The district
court rejected EPA's contention that both plaintiffs' actions were
precluded by CWA § 509(b)(1), which provides for exclusive court
of appeals jurisdiction of challenges to specified EPA regulatory
actions. EPA cross-appealed in both cases maintaining the position that their interpretation of the ambiguous term "pollutant"
was reasonable and in line with Congress's intent in the CWA and
FIFRA. EPA here reasserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to the Pesticide Rule.
Summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Keystone
Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 353 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2003).
De novo review is also appropriate where judicial proceedings are
brought to enforce certain administrative actions. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). This Court
may conduct an "arbitrary and capricious" review, which would
require the court to use the "hard look" doctrine. Id. at 416.
While this is a demanding standard of review, courts have, for
good reason, been reluctant to find an abuse of discretion when an
agency has acted in accordance with the authority vested in it by
Congress. Chevron v. NRDC , 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1987). The
focal point for de novo review is the administrative record, and
this Court must determine whether the lower court's holdings
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were reasonable and proper in light of that record. Camp v. Pitts,
411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In order to respond to an increase in public concern over West
Nile Virus in recent years (which, along with other avian viruses,
is primarily transmitted to humans by mosquitoes), EPA sought a
means by which mosquito control activities could be implemented
without running afoul of the pertinent CWA regulations. EPA
took this action in an attempt to balance the need to protect
human health and life with the CWA's express intent of protecting
the integrity of the Nation's waters. (R. at 8.) EPA recognized
that absent clarification as to the term "pollutant," any aerial application of pesticides (even FIFRA-registered pesticides) to combat mosquitoes could restricted under the guidelines of a CWArequired National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. (R. at 6.) The CWA requires a NPDES permit
when an activity 1) discharges 2) a pollutant 3) to navigable waters 4) from a point source. (R. at 6.) In the applications EPA was
anticipating, the only disputed element is the meaning of the word
"pollutant." (R. at 7.)
In 2003, EPA commenced the regulatory process that ultimately led to adoption of the Pesticide Rule. (R. at 6.) Under the
"interim guidance" document published in 2003, which expressed
the view adopted by the final rule, pesticide applications directly
to water, and applications directly over water, are not the discharge of "pollutants" so long as they are done in compliance with
relevant FIFRA requirements, including label restrictions. (R. at
6.) EPA then solicited comments, which afforded all interested
parties an opportunity to present evidence and suggestions as to
the potential environmental impacts of this rule and the needs of
the regulated community. (R. at 6.) EPA issued a "final guidance"
document in 2005 and the completed Pesticide Rule on November
27, 2006. (R. at 7.) EPA made sure to note at each stage of the
process that this regulation related only to the two circumstances
provided, and that it was studying related issues, like pesticide
drift, and may engage in rulemaking as to those issues in the future. (R. at 6, 10.)
The Pesticide Rule does not impose new restrictions or requirements on the regulated community; rather, it provides very
specific exemptions to the NPDES permitting requirements by interpreting the disputably ambiguous term "pollutant" in the CWA
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to exclude biological aquatic pesticides and chemical aerial pesticides used in compliance with FIFRA. (R. at 2.) The Pesticide
Rule does not make using or applying pesticides in violation of
FIFRA a crime: FIFRA does that under its own authority. (R. at
8.) Nor does the Pesticide Rule require permits for pesticide applications: the CWA does that. (R. at 4.)
The city of Progress created a "mosquito control plan" that incorporated the use of a biological larvicide which would be permitted under the Pesticide Rule and a chemical aerial pesticide which
would not be permitted because applying that pesticide over water
is in direct conflict with its FIFRA labeling. (R. at 6). Baykeepers
filed their claim against the Pesticide Rule before pesticides were
applied, or results from such pesticides were present, and even
before any infected mosquitoes that were the prerequisite for the
implementation of the "mosquito control plan" were found in the
area. (R. at 7.) Farmers, who had a conditional contract to provide the services needed for the "mosquito control plan" brought
their action at the same time. (R. at 5.) Farmers had never been
the subject of any enforcement action, nor was such an action ever
threatened against them. (R. at 5-7.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Baykeepers lack standing under Article III of the Constitution to bring this action. Baykeepers failed to establish an injury
in fact, which is an essential element under Defenders of Wildlife.
In order to establish an injury in fact, Baykeepers were required
to provide evidence showing that their injury is concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent.
The Pesticide Rule amounted to the approval or promulgation
of an effluent limitation or other limitation. According to Montgomery Envtl. Coal. V. Costle, "effluent limitations" are technical
specifications of the quantities of various polluting substances
that may lawfully be discharged by point sources. Effectively, the
Pesticide Rule implements an industry-wide regulation for point
sources that discharge FIFRA-registered pesticides and/or insecticides in efforts to control pests in and near water. Following Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, jurisdiction to review industry-wide
regulations for existing point sources is conferred upon the courts
of appeals by CWA § 509(b)(1). Thus, Baykeepers and Farmers
erred in filing their original suits in U.S. district court.
Because these cases should have been commenced in the court
of appeals, the 120-day statute of limitations of CWA § 509(b)(1)
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should not be tolled. CWA § 509(b)(1) provides that application for
review of the Administrator's action after 120 days can only be
made if such application is based solely on grounds which arose
after such 120th day. There are no new grounds in this case. The
challenges of Baykeepers and Farmers are the same as those
brought immediately following the issuance of the Pesticide Rule.
Farmers' claim that the Pesticide Rule should include additional pesticides is not ripe because it fails both parts of the test
established in Abbott Labs. The issue is fact specific and potentially influenced by current agency research, so it could benefit
both the agency and the court to defer. These benefits are not outweighed by Farmers interests because they have failed to prove
immediate and practical hardship. As set forth in Eagle-Picher,a
mere potential for future harm is not enough to sustain an allegation of hardship, and Farmers have no proof of existing hardship
and no new burdens placed on them by the Pesticide Rule.
EPA's interpretation of the CWA is permissible because Congress did not directly address pesticides in the definition of "pollutant." Under Chevron, if Congress has not directly addressed the
issue at hand, then the court should determine whether the
agency's interpretation is permissible, and if so, give deference to
that agency. Both Baykeepers' and Farmers' challenges should
fail because the language of the CWA regarding the term "pollutant" is ambiguous, and EPA's action is in line with the congressional intent expressed in the CWA. Further, the Pesticide Rule is
reasonable because EPA thoroughly evaluated the CWA before issuing the rule and based its decision on reasonable research and
reporting relating to the balancing of the goals of protecting the
nation's water and protecting human health and life. Thus, EPA's
construction of the Pesticide Rule deserves full deference.
ARGUMENT
I.

Baykeepers lack standing under Article III of the
Constitution to challenge the Pesticide Rule
because Baykeepers have failed to
demonstrate an injury in fact.

This Court should grant summary judgment in favor of EPA
because Baykeepers lack standing under Article III of the Constitution to bring this action. Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
Further, the doctrine of standing identifies those cases that
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should be resolved through the federal judicial process. Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). The Supreme Court has
interpreted the doctrine of standing to contain the following three
elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact; (2)
the plaintiffs injury must be causally connected to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it must be likely that the plaintiffs injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the court.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). It is the
burden of the plaintiff to set forth facts that satisfy all three of
these elements. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155. In this case,
Baykeepers have failed to meet the element of "injury in fact."
The Supreme Court has defined "injury in fact" as "an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
A.

Baykeepers have failed to demonstrate a "concrete
and particularized" injury in fact.

This court should dismiss Baykeepers' claim because
Baykeepers have failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury in fact. When evaluating whether an injury is concrete
and particularized the Supreme Court requires that the plaintiff
provide specific testimony showing substantial injury. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). Further, the plaintiff should provide sworn statements documenting damages.
Friendsof the Earth,Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 183 (2000). If a plaintiff fails to provide evidence supporting an injury in fact, then that plaintiff lacks standing and
should be dismissed on summary judgment.
Testimony demonstrating injury in fact requires more than
generalized allegations. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 882. In
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, the Federation assailed the Bureau of Land
Management's program covering millions of acres, alleging that
the program illegally opened up public lands to mining activities.
Id. at 879. The defendants moved for summary judgment, challenging the plaintiff organization's standing to initiate the action.
Id. at 889. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not
survive the summary judgment motion merely by offering "averments which state only that one of [the organization's] members
uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some
portions of which mining activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action." Id.
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The evidence must show that the injury is to the plaintiff not
to the environment. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. Plaintiffs adequately aver injury in fact when they present affidavits and testimony that show how the defendant's actions directly affected their
recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests. Id. at 183-84. In
Laidlaw, plaintiffs filed a citizen suit against the owner of a hazardous wastes incinerator facility claiming noncompliance with
the NPDES permit and sought relief. Id. at 176-77. Defendants
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff lacked
standing under Article III. Id. at 177. Plaintiffs submitted affidavits and testimony of conditional statements that if not for the defendant's actions they would enjoy the environmental resource for
recreational purposes. Id. at 184. The Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's finding that "by the very slimmest of margins"
the plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit. Id. at 177.
In contrast to the plaintiffs in Laidlaw, Baykeepers have not
given testimony showing how the Pesticide Rule has directly affected their current activities. Unlike the conditional statements
provided by the plaintiffs in Laidlaw, Baykeepers' testimony
claims only an apprehension of possible future injury. Ima
Fisher's affidavit states that she has concerns about the application of pesticides because it may cause fish kills and reduce reproduction of finfish and crab in the salt marshes where she fishes
commercially. (R. at 5.) However, the only affidavit addressing
fish kills states that the pesticides have had an effect on fish in
freshwater lakes. (R. at 6.) Thus, Fisher's concern about fish kills
is not supported by the evidence, because there is no testimony
that her fishing activities occur in fresh water, only that she fishes
in the brackish water of the estuary. (R. at 6.) In addition, Fisher
gives no testimony as to her economic reliance on crab populations, and Baykeeper has failed to provide any concrete numbers
or evidence with regard to the effect that declining crab populations would have on Fisher. (R. at 5.)
Like the plaintiffs in Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, Baykeepers have
presented mere general averments about the affects of the Pesticide Rule. Sam Schwimmer's affidavit has no factual basis. The
affidavit presented by Baykeepers makes no mention of how pesticides would affect birds in the marshlands or humans swimming
in the area. (R. at 6.) Furthermore, Schwimmer gives no indication that the Pesticide Rule has actually affected his recreational
use of Laconic Bay; rather, Schwimmer expresses concern about
possible future effects. (R. at 5.)
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Overall, Baykeepers have failed to present concrete and particularized testimony sufficient to show injury in fact. The testimony provided by Fisher and Schwimmer provides little more
than speculative allegations about potential injury. Further, the
affidavits provide no evidence of how the Pesticide Rule has negatively affected Baykeepers. Baykeepers do not have standing,
even "by the very slimmest of margins." Accordingly, this Court
should dismiss Baykeepers' claim for lack of standing.
B.

Baykeepers have failed to show actual or imminent
injury.

This Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the
EPA because the affidavits submitted by Baykeepers fail to show
actual or imminent injury. The Supreme Court has concluded
that if a plaintiff has not suffered an actual injury, then the alleged injury must be imminent. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
564. When determining whether an injury is imminent the Supreme Court has considered whether the threat is realistic. Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 (1983). Thus, the plaintiff must
show that the injury complained of would, in the near future, negatively affect the plaintiff.
In order to show injury in fact, plaintiffs must provide more
than speculative apprehensions about the future. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564. The Supreme Court has "insisted that
the injury proceed with a high degree of immediacy," so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no injury would
have occurred at all. Id. at 564. In Defenders of Wildlife, plaintiffs
filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior seeking interpretation of the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 557. The Supreme
Court determined that defendant's motion for summary judgment
should have been affirmed by the circuit court because the plaintiffs failed to establish all three prongs required for standing. Id.
at 568. "Although 'imminence' is concededly a somewhat elastic
concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose." Id. at 564.
The Court found that the concept had "been stretched beyond the
breaking point, when, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury
at some indefinite future time." Id.
The Supreme Court also interpreted standing to require a
"real and immediate" likelihood that plaintiffs will be injured. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102. In Lyons, the plaintiff lacked standing to
seek an injunction against the enforcement of a police chokehold
policy because he could not "credibly allege that he faced a realis-
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tic threat from the policy." Id. at 106 n.7. Thus, if the plaintiffs
alleged injury is unreasonable, then the court should dismiss the
claim. Id. at 107.
Like the claim in Lyons, Baykeepers' claims are unreasonable. Schwimmer's affidavit provides no evidence to support his
claim that the Pesticide Rule will result in his inability to enjoy
Laconic Bay for recreational purposes. (R. at 5.) Baykeepers' affidavits do not provide information about adverse affects of pesticides on birds or humans. (R. at 6.) Furthermore, like the
plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife, Fisher alleges indefinite injuries. She provides no fixed or precise indication of how the Pesticide Rule will injure her. (R. at 5.) Rather, she expresses a
general concern over the use of pesticides. (R. at 5.) In addition,
the Baykeepers' concern is a reaction to the proposed use of Anvil
10+10 in the Mosquito Control Plan, not the Pesticide Rule. (R. at
6.) The Pesticide Rule would not condone the application of Anvil
10+10 to Laconic Bay because such a use would be in violation of
the pesticide's FIFRA label. (R. at 6.)
Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Baykeepers' claims
due to lack of standing. Baykeepers have failed to provide any
evidence that they have suffered an injury in fact, and the affidavits submitted express only hypothetical claims and concerns.
Without a showing of injury there can be no standing. Thus, this
Court should grant summary judgment in favor of EPA.
II. All challenges to the Pesticide Rule should have
been brought directly in the court of appeals
because the Pesticide Rule amounts to the
approval or promulgation of an effluent
limitation.
This Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the
EPA because both Baykeepers' and Farmers' challenges to the
Pesticide Rule should have been brought directly in the court of
appeals pursuant to CWA § 509(b)(1). 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
Under CWA § 509(b)(1), judicial review of the regulation at issue
lies exclusively in the court of appeals. Appellants Baykeepers
and Farmers erred in filing their original suits in U.S. district
court, thus both actions before this court should be dismissed with
prejudice. In the 1972 amendments to the CWA, Congress substantially overhauled the nation's system of water pollution control, authorizing the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate and
enforce standards for the discharge of pollutants. 33 U.S.C.A.
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§§ 1251 et seq. The amendments strengthened the Act by adding
several enforcement and jurisdictional provisions, among them
CWA § 509(b)(1), which provides for direct court of appeals review
of six specified actions taken by the Administrator: (A) promulgating any standard of performance under CWA § 306; (B) making
any determination pursuant to CWA § 306(b)(1)(C); (C) promulgating any effluent standard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard under CWA § 307; (D) making any determination as to a
State permit program submitted under CWA § 402(b); (E) approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation
under CWA §§ 301, 302, 306, or 405; (F) issuing or denying any
permit under CWA § 402; and (G) promulgating any individual
control strategy under CWA § 304(1). 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). EPA
no longer asserts that the issuance of the Pesticide Rule was
equivalent to the issuance or denial of a permit under CWA § 402.
EPA does, however, maintain its contention that the issuance of
the Pesticide Rule amounted to the approval or promulgation of
an effluent limitation or other limitation, and, accordingly, that
the only proper context for judicial review was in the court of
appeals.
According to Montgomery Envtl. Coal. v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568,
574 (D.C. Cir. 1980), "effluent limitations" are technical specifications of the quantities of various polluting substances that may be
lawfully discharged by point sources. Further, in Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F. 2d 1011, (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court stated
that jurisdiction to review industry-wide regulations for existing
point sources is conferred upon the court of appeals by CWA
§ 509(b)(1). The Pesticide Rule is an agency action with respect to
"an effluent limitation or other limitation," because it technically
specifies the quantity of FIFRA-registered pesticides and/or insecticides that may be lawfully discharged over or near water without a NPDES permit by exempting such pesticides from the
permitting requirement so long as the dispersal is in compliance
with FIFRA standards. (R. at 8.) Further, the effect of the Pesticide Rule is to implement an industry-wide regulation for point
sources that discharge FIFRA-registered pesticides and/or insecticides in efforts to control pests in and near water. While the practical effect of the regulation is to de-regulate a class of potential
pollutants and polluters, the Pesticide Rule nevertheless functions
to assert EPA's statutory authority as a regulator-here, with regard to allowing a limited class of point-source dischargers to operate without NPDES permits. Thus, the proper jurisdiction for a
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challenge of the scope and validity of the Pesticide Rule was the
court of appeals.
Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides that "final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review" in the district
courts. 5 U.S.C. § 704. (emphasis supplied) In Garmon v.
Warner, 358 F Supp 206, 208 (W.D. NC 1973), the court held that
the 5 U.S.C. § 704 provision for court review of administrative decisions is a jurisdictional statute "to the limited extent of conferring jurisdiction for review of administrative decisions in federal
court where such review cannot be predicated on other jurisdictional statutes." (emphasis supplied) Furthermore, in Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988), the Supreme Court held
that 5 U.S.C. § 704 does not provide additional judicial remedies
for review of federal agency action in situations where Congress
has provided "special and adequate" administrative review
procedures.
In this case, review of the challenge to the Pesticide Rule was
predicated on a jurisdictional statute from within the very law
that formed the basis for the challenge. Both Baykeepers and
Farmers had at their disposal the "special and adequate" administrative review procedures detailed in CWA § 509(b)(1)-a clear directive that any challenge to the agency actions described in the
section are subject to review by the court of appeals. The intent of
Congress in enacting CWA § 509(b)(1) was to streamline decision
making and insure prompt high level judicial review of the enumerated acts of the Administrator. Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F.
Supp. 70, 76 (N.D. Cal. 1976). This indicates a congressional determination to vest jurisdiction over all discharge regulations in
the court of appeals. Shell Oil, 415 F. Supp. at 76. There is a
strong presumption against the availability of simultaneous review in both district courts and courts of appeals. Sun Enter., Ltd.
v. Train, 532 F.2d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Oljato Chapter of
Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). Furthermore, absent extraordinary conditions, review of agency action
under CWA § 509(b)(1) is exclusive to the court of appeals. Id.
Courts have consistently held that where there is ambiguity as to
whether jurisdiction lies with a district court or with a court of
appeals, that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of review by a
court of appeals. Denberg v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 696 F.2d 1193,
1197 (7th Cir. 1983). Thus, insomuch as the Pesticide Rule consti-
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tutes agency action under CWA § 509(b)(1), the only proper context for a challenge of its scope and validity is the court of appeals.
In E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112
(1977), the Supreme Court held that review of the EPA Administrator's action in promulgating "effluent limitations guidelines"
was in the court of appeals under CWA § 509(b)(1)(E). The Supreme Court rejected DuPont's limiting of CWA § 509(b)(1)(E),
finding that such a construction would produce a perverse situation in which the court of appeals could review individual actions
issuing or denying permits but would have no power of direct review of the regulations governing those actions. Id.; see also,
NRDC v. EPA, 673 F.2d 400, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court regarded CWA § 509(b)(1)(E) as unambiguously authorizing court of appeals review of any EPA action promulgating
effluent limitations. Id. It also noted that since those limitations
are typically promulgated in the same proceeding as new source
standards, Congress intended that review be in the court of appeals-the forum in which agency actions of national import may
be reviewed with the most economy and to the greatest judicial
effect. See id. at 137. Overall, in DuPont, as in other cases, the
Supreme Court ascribes to CWA § 509(b)(1) a practical rather
than a cramped construction. Id.; See also Crown Simpson Pulp
Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980).
In this case, EPA has promulgated a rule that functions as
"effluent limitation guidelines," by which a set class of effluents
(FIFRA-registered pesticides discharged into, over, and/or near
water) is granted a limited exemption from the NPDES permitting
requirement for point-source discharges. (R. at 6-7.) An effluent
limitation guideline may set a numerical limit for the discharge of
a pollutant, but a guideline may also set a limit by terms that are
not quantifiable. In this case, the effluent "limitation" is defined
by the standard of certification and legal use under FIFRA.
A pesticide not certified by FIFRA would not be exempt under
the Pesticide Rule; equally, a pesticide not legally used under
FIFRA would not be exempt under the Pesticide Rule. Thus, the
guideline in limiting the discharge of pesticides into protected waters is whether the discharge is consistent with the standards set
through the FIFRA certification and labeling process; only discharges that meet those limiting standards will be exempt from
NPDES permitting. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in
DuPont, such an "effluent limitation guideline" as the Pesticide
Rule should be reviewed in the court of appeals. Furthermore,
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given the procedural posture of this case, it is absurd that the
court of appeals should to be limited to a review of the district
court's decision without the benefits of its own full and robust judicial inquiry, especially when the impact of the Pesticide Rule
will be felt nationwide. Thus, the initial review of the Pesticide
Rule should properly be in the court of appeals.
In NRDC v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit directly addressed the importance of circuit court review of new CWA regulations. 673 F.2d
at 405; see also, NRDC v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
VEPCO v. Costle, 566 F.2d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 1977). The court
found that national uniformity, an important goal in dealing with
broad regulations, is best served by initial review in the court of
appeals. Id. The court held that in considering challenges to Consolidated Permit Regulations ("CPRs") issued by the EPA, the
court of appeals had jurisdiction, since the CPRs were an "effluent
limitation or other limitation" within the meaning of the CWA.
NRDC, 673 F. 2d at 405. The court held that CWA § 509(b)(1)
vested initial authority to review the challenged regulations in the
courts of appeals. Id. at 402. The court further asserted that the
case for first-instance judicial review in a court of appeals is
stronger for broad, policy-oriented rules than for specific, technology-based rules. Id. at 405. The court found that a fair reading of
an earlier NRDC opinion issued by the same court, alongside the
VEPCO opinion from the Fourth Circuit, showed that neither decision was based on the technical characteristics of the rules. Id.
Indeed, the court's review in the 1981 NRDC case was largely an
application of legal standards to the EPA's policy judgments, not
its technical determinations. Id.; NRDC, 656 F.2d at 776-86.
EPA recognizes that courts have "counseled against the expansive application of [§ 509(b)]." League of Wilderness Defenders
v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002). However, in this
case, Baykeepers' and Farmers' challenges are clearly to a rule
that effectuates an "effluent limitation or other limitation"-albeit
a limitation that is somewhat different than those typically implemented under the NPDES permitting regime.
Neither
Baykeepers' nor Farmers' challenges addressed any technical
characteristic of the rule; rather they addressed whether EPA
could legitimately interpret the term "pollutant" to exclude a limited class of pesticides applied into or over water in accordance
with FIFRA requirements. (R. at 1-2.) National uniformity would
best be served by reviewing the policy implications of the Pesticide
Rule in the court of appeals. These policy implications were
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clearly understood by both appellants at the time that they filed
their complaints in the District Court. Indeed, their complaints
were a mere disagreement with EPA's policy judgment that by
modifying the regulation of effluent limitations to accommodate
the lawful use of pesticides in controlling aquatic pests, the objectives of the CWA would still be met, and the need to protect
human health would be provided for. Accordingly, this Court
should find that both Baykeepers' and Farmers' challenges to the
Pesticide Rule should have been brought directly in the court of
appeals pursuant to CWA § 509(b)(1), precluding district court jurisdiction over any challenge to the Pesticide Rule, and the challenges should be dismissed.
III. This court should not toll the 120-day statute of
limitations of CWA § 509(b)(1) because these
cases should have been commenced in the
court of appeals.
The CWA provides that application for review of the Administrator's action "shall be made within 120 days from the date of
such determination, approval, promulgation, issuance or denial,
or after such date only if such application is based solely on
grounds which arose after such 120th day." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(1). Thus, direct appellate review in the courts of appeals
under CWA § 509(b)(1) carries with it "a peculiar sting" for potential challengers: any agency action reviewable under its provisions
must be challenged within 120 days, unless based on new
"grounds" arising after the expiration of that time frame, and cannot thereafter be challenged in any "civil or criminal proceeding
for enforcement." 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b); NarragansettElec. Co. v.
EPA, 407 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2005). (emphasis supplied) There
are no new grounds in this case; indeed, the challenges before this
Court are the same challenges that Baykeepers and Farmers
brought immediately following issuance of the Pesticide Rule.
The short time allowed for challenging agency action under
CWA § 509(b) clearly reflects Congress's effort to protect both
EPA's and the public's interests in finality in certain matters, particularly in regards to rulemaking with substantial significance
and scope. Narragansett,407 F.3d at 12. In contrast, the standard
statute of limitations for APA actions is six years. See Trafalgar
Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Cuomo, 159 F.3d 21, 34 (1st Cir. 1998).
Since some but not all of the actions that EPA can take under the
CWA are listed with considerable specificity in CWA § 509(b), not
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all EPA actions taken under the CWA are directly reviewable in
the court of appeals. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 333
F.3d 184, 189-90 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,
538 F.2d 513, 518 (2d Cir. 1976). Yet, because EPA has demonstrated that the matter before this Court is just such a specific
case, reviewable under the provisions of CWA § 509(b),
Baykeepers and Farmers must be bound to the statutorily-limited
120-day period in which to file their challenge. Because this period has expired, and because Baykeepers and Farmers did not
follow correct procedure, this Court should dismiss their challenges with prejudice.
Baykeepers and Farmers had ample opportunity to participate in the regulatory rulemaking process that ultimately led to
the adoption of the Pesticide Rule. The development of the Pesticide Rule occurred over several years, during which the public was
regularly apprised of EPA's position, and the status of the rule in
development. (R. at 6-7.) When EPA first published its "interim
guidance" document in 2003, it expressed the view adopted by the
final rule-that pesticides applied directly to water and over
water are not discharges of "pollutants" so long as they are done in
compliance with relevant FIFRA requirements. 68 Fed. Reg.
48,385 (Aug. 13, 2003); (R. at 6.) After soliciting comments on its
interim guidance document, EPA issued a "final guidance" document in 2005. 70 Fed. Reg. 5093 (Feb. 1, 2005); (R. at 7.)At the
same time, EPA issued the proposed rule that is the basis of this
lawsuit. (R. at 7.) Before issuing the final rule, EPA received
many comments. (R. at 7.) Though the record is silent as to the
roles that Baykeepers and Farmers played in the rulemaking process, it is clear that the point of ingress was open, and that the
final Pesticide Rule was a product of the cumulative efforts of
many interested parties.
EPA and the parties that it regulates share a significant interest in the finality of rulemaking, particularly in regard to pest
control. The implications of leaving the Pesticide Rule open to
challenges after local governments have begun reasonably to rely
on the rule in implementing aerial application of pesticides into
and over water would be untenable considering the public health
import to the Pesticide Rule. Though the class of potentially affected parties is large, the Court need look only to City of Progress
as one example of a municipality that could potentially suffer a
public health crisis if it is not allowed to act in reasonable reliance
on the EPA's authority in issuing the Pesticide Rule. Accordingly,
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this Court should hold that because these cases should have been
commenced in the court of appeals, and because both Baykeepers
and Farmers were afforded the opportunity to participate in the
development of the Pesticide Rule, the 120-day statute of limitations of CWA § 509(b)(1) should not be tolled.
IV. Farmers' challenge is not ripe for judicial review
at this time: the issues are not fit for judicial
decision, and deferral would not cause an
outweighing hardship.
This Court should uphold the ruling of the district court in
this case and find that Farmers' challenge is not ripe for judicial
review under the two-prong test established by the United States
Supreme Court. Abbott Labs v. Gardner,387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
This test requires an evaluation of "the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration." Id. at 149. To satisfy the first ("fitness of the
issues") prong of this test, the questions presented must be purely
legal and not fact-specific, a postponement of review must not provide the court with the possibility of greater understanding of the
issue, and there must be a hardship to the appellants that can be
weighed against the benefit of postponement. Better Gov't Ass'n v.
Dep't of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
To satisfy the second ("hardship of the parties") prong, the
"immediate and practical impact" on those seeking relief from the
agency's actions must outweigh the competing interest in deferring the judicial involvement. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759
F.2d 905, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Analyzing ripeness in the context
of judicial review of an agency's action is an attempt by the court
to balance competing interests: a petitioners' concern over allegedly unlawful activity by the agency, the agency's interest in acting free from judicial interference until their action is complete,
and the court's interest in waiting to decide issues until they are
at their final stage. Consolidation Coal v. Fed. Mine Safety, 824
F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Farmers' challenge fails both prongs of this test.
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Farmers' challenge is not fit for judicial review
because it is fact-specific and potentially influenced
by current agency research.

This Court should uphold the ruling of the district court in
this case and find that Farmers' claim is not ripe because the issues are not fit for judicial review. In a "fitness of the issues"
analysis, the question must be a purely legal one so as to provide
an assumption that judicial involvement would be suitable. Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 916. When an action is being applied
against a regulated community, an isolated question of whether
an agency action was undertaken in accordance with law is a
purely legal one. Id. In Eagle-Picher, the industry petitioners
asked the court to find that the ranking methodology established
by the Hazardous Ranking System was unlawful and so should
not be used to place them on the National Priorities List ("NPL").
Id. at 908. The action in the case had already been applied to the
industry petitioners by using a ranking methodology to determine
that they should be placed on the NPL. Id. at 911. At the time of
filing, the EPA had not yet engaged in an enforcement action
against the industry petitioners, and even at the time prior to the
publication of the NPL, the action was already being applied to
the petitioners in a manner that would expose them to a heightened potential for liability in the future. Id. at 912.
When an agency action has taken its final form and is being
used as the ultimate guidance on the issue it addresses, there is
little to no likelihood that a postponement of review would provide
the court with any greater understanding of the issue. Better
Gov't Ass'n, 780 F.2d at 93. In Better Gov't Ass'n, the agency had
specifically stated "that the action in question governs and will
continue to govern its decisions. . ." and that this action was a
final decision as to the matter. Id. The regulation in question had
been in existence for over two years and there had been no indication that any additional development would be expected in regards to this rule. Id. The court recognized that other courts had
taken a flexible and pragmatic approach to the question of finality, and that this approach is oriented around how the agency
treats that action and the communication provided to the regulated community (not to the court) as to the action's finality. Id.
(referencing Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 149-50).
Unlike the purely legal analysis in Eagle-Picher,this Court is
being asked to force an agency to expand the scope of its action to
include additional activities. (R. at 2-3.) While Farmers are chal-
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lenging the legality of the rule passed, they are doing so with the
intent not of declaring the rule invalid or inapplicable, but rather
declaring that other applications of pesticides be exempted from
CWA permitting requirements as well. (R. at 2.) This request
seems to go outside a purely legal analysis, because whether or
not other applications of pesticides would even be related to, much
less regulated by, CWA permitting requirements is purely an issue
of fact. (R. at 5-6, 10.) This is different from the challenge in Eagle-Picher because that regulation was exposing the industrial petitioners to the potential for heightened liability-this regulation
is simply exempting certain pesticide applications from permitting
requirements that Farmers may or may not be engaged in. (R. at
5.) The factual nature of this issue makes it unfit for judicial review at this time; as the lower court states, any decision on this
matter would be better deferred to a later rule or enforcement action. (R. at 11.)
As opposed to the finality of the action in Better Gov't Ass'n,
the Pesticide Rule, as it may potentially apply to pesticide drift,
terrestrial applications of pesticides, and pesticide residue, is still
under review. (R. at 10.) There has been no statement that the
Pesticide Rule is the final rule regarding these applications; in
fact, the opposite is true: within the Pesticide Rule itself is a discussion of EPA's intent to "continue to consider the applicability of
the CWA to situations other than those addressed by [this] action.. ." Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg at 68,483; (R. at 10.) Here we
have a regulation barely a year old that contains within it the establishment of a workgroup with the sole purpose of addressing
some of the concerns raised by Farmers. Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed.
Reg at 68,483. This contrasts specifically with the treatment of
the action by the agencies in Abbott Labs and Better Gov't Ass'n as
the final and governing rule on the matter. EPA has been clear
from the moment this regulation was issued that the applicability
of this action to other applications of pesticides that may have an
impact on water quality was still being researched and that it may
make rules to that effect in the future. (R. at 10.) With that in
mind, the current Pesticide Rule is not in its final form in regard
to the challenges raised by Farmers and so should not be subject
to judicial interpretation at this time.

21

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
B.

[Vol. 25

The deferral of Farmers' challenge will not pose an
immediate and practical impact rising to the level
of hardship.

This Court should uphold the ruling of the district court and
find that Farmers' claim is not ripe because the impact to Farmers
does not rise to the level of hardship. In a "hardship to the parties" analysis, courts have looked as to whether the action's impact is "immediate, direct, and significant" on the regulated party.
Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 152. In Abbott Labs, the affected party
was immediately, directly, and significantly affected; it was put in
a position where it had to comply with a rule that imposed extensive new burdens-or risk prosecution. Id. Any interest that an
agency or court may have in deferring review may be outweighed
by a substantial hardship. ConsolidationCoal, 824 F.2d at 1078.
In ConsolidationCoal, the affected party showed injury to the extent that they were exposed to greater civil fines and the potential
for harsher penalties later because they had been found in violation of the rule. Id.
The allegation that the action imposes a hardship will not be
sustained if the hardship reflects a "mere potential for future injury." State Farm, 802 F.2d at 480 (quoting Alascom, Inc. v. FCC,
727 F.2d 1212, 1217 (D.C. Cir.1984)) (emphasis in original). This
was found to be the case in State Farm, where a proposed rule
regarding automobile safety devices was going to supplant the existing regulations in favor of the new rule; because of the implausibility of the rule, the court found that the potential for future
injury did not rise to the level of a hardship. Id. In State Farm,
the court found the "institutional interest in avoiding speculative
controversies" outweighed any potential hardship when the action
proposed was unlikely to ever itself be used as a tool to control the
actions of the petitioners. Id. at 481.
The Pesticide Rule is not what subjects Farmers to the risk of
prosecution if they apply pesticides in violation of FIFRA; FIFRA
does that under its own authority. (R. at 8). The Pesticide Rule
does not require Farmers to obtain a NPDES permit before taking
action that may have an impact on water quality; if and when
such a permit is required, the CWA requires it. (R. at 4.) Any
hardship to the parties is not a result of the passing of the Pesticide Rule; it is a result of long-standing and well-established environmental regulations. (R. at 7-8.) When the city of Progress
developed its Mosquito Control Plan, (contracting conditionally
with Farmers to provide those services) it did so knowing that its
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intended use of Anvil 10+10 would be in violation of FIFRA. (R. at
6.) While the EPA has every intention of providing steps by which
communities can protect themselves against the threat of waterborne insects, actions must still be taken to avoid unnecessary environmental consequences. (R. at 8.) If the City of Progress wants
to proceed with its initial plan, instead of switching to pesticides
in full compliance with the Pesticide Rule and the CWA, it would
only have to file for a NPDES permit. (R. at 13.)
Unlike the imposition of new burdens on the party in Abbott
Labs, the Farmers face no new requirements-if they continue operating in the way they have in the past, the Pesticide Rule will
have no impact on them greater than the existing environmental
regulations. (R. at 4, 7-8.) Unlike the injury demonstrated in
Consolidation Coal, no heightened risk of prosecution or enforcement action results from the current refusal of the Pesticide Rule
to provide exemptions for the pesticide usages and applications referred to by Farmers. The risk is the same as it has always been.
Like the implausibility of the rule being used against the petitioners in State Farm, the Pesticide Rule is not likely ever to be used
as a tool to control Farmers' actions. (R. at 11.)
This Court should uphold the ruling of the district court and
find that Farmers' challenge is not ripe for judicial review under
the two-prong test established by the Supreme Court. The question of whether the failure of the Pesticide Rule to include additional exemptions is in violation of law is not a purely legal one,
nor is the rule at its final and complete state such that postponement could not provide additional help to the court in deciding
this matter. The interest of postponing, until such a time as relevant factual determinations are made and EPA has conclusively
addressed Farmers' concerns, outweighs any potential hardship to
the regulated parties, especially since any hardship that is present is not a result of the Pesticide Rule but rather a result of
preexisting environmental regulations. For these reasons, this
Court should sustain the ruling of the district court as to this
issue.
V.

This Court should find EPA's reasonable
construction of the ambiguous language in the
Clean Water Act permissible and give full
deference to it.

EPA's interpretation of the CWA is permissible because Congress did not directly address pesticides in the definition of "pollu-
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tant." A court must answer two questions when reviewing an
agency's interpretation of a statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
First, the court must determine whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. Id. If the intent of Congress is clear, then the court and the agency must give effect to the
expressed intent of Congress. Id. If, however, the court recognizes
that Congress has not directly addressed the issue at hand, then
the court should determine whether the agency's interpretation is
a permissible construction of the statute. Id. If the court finds
that the agency's interpretation is permissible, then the court
must give deference to the agency even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation. Id.
Here, the CWA lacked a clear congressional intent as to
whether certain pesticides fall under the definition of pollutant
and thus require a NPDES permit. The overarching congressional
intent of the CWA is protection of the integrity of the nation's waters by prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant into water without a NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1311(a), 1342(a).
However, as regards to more specific intent, Congress provides a
list of substances that constitute pollutants but does not inform
this list with specific definitions. 33 U.S.C. §1362(6). The EPA
interpreted the definition of the term "pollutant" to exclude certain pesticides and issued a regulation stating that the application
of a pesticide in compliance with relevant requirements of FIFRA
does not require a NPDES permit in two specific circumstances.
Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,483. The first circumstance is
when the pesticide is applied directly to the water in order to control aquatic pests. Id. The second is when the application of a pesticide is made to control pests that are over or near waters of the
United States. Id. In both circumstances, the EPA's interpretation
is consistent with congressional intent. Therefore, this Court
should give deference to the EPA and reverse the district court's
grant of summary judgment.
In analyzing the EPA's interpretation of the word "pollutant,"
this Court must look first at whether that term is ambiguous or if
it expresses clear and certain congressional intent. Looking at the
record and arguing against the claims of both Baykeepers and
Farmers, the actions of EPA in exempting specific pesticide applications and not exempting others was done based on reports and
information linking EPA's interpretation of the word "pollutant"
with its desire to uphold the goal of the CWA to protect the integ-
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rity of the nation's waters and its desire to protect and preserve
human health and life. For these reasons, this Court should rule
in favor of EPA by: (1) overturning the summary judgment for
Baykeepers entered in the lower court; and (2) finding Farmers'
challenge to be unsupported and void.
A.

The Clean Water Act is ambiguous with respect to
whether certain pesticides constitute pollutants.

The District Court erred in finding that the language of the
CWA regarding the term "pollutant" is unambiguous. When evaluating whether a statute's language is clear or ambiguous, courts
use the traditional tools of statutory interpretation including the
text of the statute, its legislative history, and the overall purpose
of the statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. When considering
the text, courts may also utilize other sources such as dictionaries.
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 240 (1994). In
addition, when determining the intent of a congressional act
through its plain meaning, the court must look at the language at
issue as well as the language as a whole. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). Further, if the statute contains a term
that has acquired a settled meaning under either equity or common law, then the court must infer that Congress intended to use
that established meaning. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., Div. of Amax,
453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981). Thus, when determining whether a statute's language is ambiguous, a court should employ the traditional
tools of statutory interpretation as well as the meaning established by the common law.
Interpretation of statutory language and legislative history
assists courts in determining whether a statute's language is clear
or ambiguous. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-64. In Chevron, the Supreme Court relied on the language and congressional intent of
the Clean Air Act in determining whether the EPA's interpretation of the term "stationary source" was a reasonable construction
of the statute. Id. at 866. The Court found that the legislative
history did not reveal a clear congressional intent, thus, it relied
on the language of the statute. Id. at 864. The court concluded
that the statute did not explicitly define stationary source even
though it did define "major stationary source." Id. at 860. Overall,
the court found that the language of the statute did not compel
any given interpretation of the term "source." Id. at 859.
If a statute fails to provide a clear meaning of terms, then
courts may consider the ordinary meaning of the term. MCI, 512
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U.S. at 225. In MCI, the Supreme Court considered whether the
plain meaning of the term "modify" included basic or fundamental
changes. Id. The Court considered many dictionary entries for the
term and concluded that its prevalent meaning was confined to
moderate changes. Id. In addition to plain meaning, the court
must look at the language as a whole. K-Mart, 486 U.S. at 291. In
K-Mart, the court found that while the congressional language
clearly banned importation of gray-market goods, the ambiguity
in the phrase "owned by," which contributes to the definition of
gray-market goods, was enough to authorize agency interpretation and action. Id. at 292.
After considering the language of the statute and its plain
meaning, the court may look to the common law for established
meaning. See NLRB, 453 U.S. at 329. In NLRB, the court held
that employer-selected trustees of a trust fund created under the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") are not "representatives" of the employer within the meaning of the LMRA. The
Court relied on the use of terms long established in the court of
chancery in deciding that Congress intended to impose traditional
fiduciary duties on trustees.
1.

Baykeepers' challenge should fail because the
district court erred in finding that the language
of the CWA regarding the term "pollutant"is
unambiguous.

As the EPA in Chevron instituted a practical definition of
"stationary source" in interpreting its regulations, in this case,
EPA determined that the term "pollutant" could not be equated
with a pesticide that is used in compliance with relevant FIFRA
requirements. The CWA is intended to protect the waters of the
United States. (R. at 7.) EPA decided to exclude certain pesticides
from NPDES permitting in accordance with the CWA because
FIFRA labeling requires that registered pesticides be used for
their intended purposes "without unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment." (R. at 8.)
In addition, the language of the CWA does not explicitly include pesticides under the definition of pollutant. The definition
of the term "pollutant" includes "chemical wastes" and "biological
materials." Like the Court's approach in MCI, EPA first considered the plain meaning of the term "chemical waste" as defined in
a common dictionary. Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486. EPA
concluded that pesticides applied consistent with FIFRA require-
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ments could not constitute wastes because they are not chemicals
that are eliminated or discarded as no longer useful. Id. at 68,487.
Similarly, biological pesticides cannot be deemed pollutants because they are put to the same uses as chemical pesticides. While
the plain meaning of biological material would seem to include all
biological material, consideration of the statute's language as a
whole would lead to ambiguity. Indeed, biological pesticides are
less likely to have adverse affects on the nation's waters than
chemical pesticides. Id. at 68,486. Thus, it would be inconsistent
with the intent of Congress to exclude biological pesticides from
the exemption while including chemical pesticides.
Furthermore, like the Court in NLRB, EPA looked to the common law for established meanings of "pollutant." EPA found that
courts interpreted biological materials to be pollutants when they
are waste materials discharged from point sources. To date, no
court has found that products applied for their intended purpose
consistent with EPA requirements constitute pollutants. EPA
does not dispute that pesticides may become pollutants after they
have been applied for their intended purposes. The difference is
that at the time the pesticide is applied to waters is cannot be
deemed a pollutant and thus should not require a permit.
Overall, EPA finds that the term "pollutant" is ambiguous.
EPA used standards consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings
in determining that the language of the CWA allows for the pesticides exception. Pesticides used in compliance with relevant
FIFRA requirements do not constitute pollutants because they are
not wastes. Further, the Pesticide Rule is consistent with congressional intent to maintain the chemical and biological integrity
of the nation's waters. Thus, this Court should reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment for Baykeepers.
2.

Farmers' challenge should fail because even if the
language is not ambiguous, EPA's action is in
line with the congressional intent expressed
in the CWA.

If this Court finds that Farmers' challenge is ripe for judicial
review, then this Court should further find that EPA's refusal to
modify the Pesticide Rule to exempt additional pesticide uses and
applications is not arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of law
under the tests provided. If this court finds, as the case law warrants, that the term "pollutant" in the CWA is ambiguous in regard to the status of pesticides, then EPA's reasonable
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interpretation of that term should be given deference. The Pesticide Rule is not intended to provide exemptions for the classified
list of pollutants set forth by Congress in the CWA, nor is it intended to supplant the protections to the environment provided by
FIFRA. Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,488. It is instead intended to clarify that certain pesticides, when applied consistently
with FIFRA regulations, are not pollutants because of the nature
of their usage and their necessary application techniques.
Even if this court finds that the language is unambiguous,
Farmers' challenge should still fail because the exclusion of exemptions for additional pesticide applications from the Pesticide
Rule is in line with the congressional intent expressed in the CWA
to protect the integrity of the nation's waters by reducing the discharge of pollutants. (R. at 7.) FIFRA provides a defense against
"unreasonable adverse affects on the environment" and looks at
"generic environmental impact." (R. at 8, 12.) To expand the Pesticide Rule to include additional uses and applications of pesticides without further research into the potential detrimental
effects of these uses and applications on water quality would be
both irresponsible and contrary to the stated intent of Congress in
the CWA and FIFRA.
B.

This Court should find EPA's construction
permissible because it was reasonable.

In determining whether an agency's construction is permissible, the court is to inquire as to whether the agency's construction
is "sufficiently reasonable." Fed. Election Comm'n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981). The Supreme Court in Fed. Election clarified this point by saying that
this standard does not require that the agency's construction be
the only or best one, simply that the reasoning used to create it
was thorough, valid, and consistent. Id. at 37. In Fed Election,
the commission interpreted ambiguous terms of a congressional
act in a way that proscribed certain forms of campaign financing.
Id. at 36. The lower court found that the commission did not provide enough reasoned and consistent explanation for this interpretation, but the Supreme Court overruled saying that the
commission had produced consistent reports that linked their interpretation with the goal of the act. Id.
When an agency's construction is reasonable, a court must
give deference to that construction and cannot supplant its own
judgment for that of the agency. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. The
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Supreme Court in Chevron expressed the reason for this deference
in that the interpretation at issue involved a complex and technical regulatory scheme that had been considered in great detail by
the agency. Id. at 865. The court's deference reflects the fact that
an agency charged with the administration of a rule is especially
able and in the best position to interpret that rule. Id. A court
may not impose its own interpretation onto an agency's construction, rather, if an agency's construction is found to be unreasonable, the court must find it in violation of the law and send it back
to the agency for further review. See id. The Supreme Court in
Chevron drew a distinction between judging the reasonableness of
an agency's interpretation and interpreting the act on its own authority, finding that the role of the court in these matters is to
determine the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation. Id.
at 845.
Intentionally and properly applied and performing pesticides
are not pollutants. Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146, 1150
(9th Cir. 2005). In Fairhurst,the court considered the reason for
which the pesticide was applied and whether the application was
in accordance with its FIFRA label in making the determination
that the pesticide used was not a pollutant. Id. This decision influenced the EPA's construction of the Pesticide Rule: in
Fairhurst,"the court considered the plain meaning of the term
"chemical waste" and noted that its analysis was in accord with
EPA's interpretation of the term in its July 2003 Interim Statement, and that EPA's interpretation is "reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." Id.; Pesticide Rule, 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,489.
1.

Baykeepers' challenge should fail because EPA's
interpretation of the CWA's language is
reasonable and therefore full deference
should be given to the agency's action.

EPA's construction of the Pesticides rule is reasonable because EPA thoroughly evaluated the CWA before issuing the rule.
EPA responded to uncertainty among the public as to how the
CWA applies to pesticides that have historically been properly
used for their intended purposes. Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at
68,485. EPA first issued an Interim Statement after deliberate
consideration through the administrative process. Id. EPA followed through all of the steps under the APA, examining the rule
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at every stage, and afforded all interested parties the opportunity
to contribute to the rule.
The final rule is reasonable because it is consistent with the
intended purpose of the CWA. The Pesticide Rule only exempts
those pesticides that are in compliance with relevant FIFRA requirements. (R. at 2.) The relevant FIFRA requirements are those
that relate to water quality. Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at
68,486. Thus, the Pesticide Rule seeks to maintain the nation's
waterways, but without requiring a permit for applications of pesticides that are already deemed not to cause unreasonable adverse
impacts on the environment. Id. at 68,485.
Overall, EPA's Interim Statement and final rule consistently
report the thoroughness of EPA's consideration in issuing the Pesticide Rule. Further, EPA's interpretation of the CWA is reasonable and in accordance with the goals of the CWA because the
Pesticide Rule promotes the maintenance of the nation's waters.
Thus, because the rule is sufficiently reasonable this Court should
give deference to EPA's construction of the rule.
2.

Farmers' challenge should fail because the EPA's
refusal to include additional pesticide
applications is reasonable.

EPA's creation of the Pesticide Rule was based upon reasonable research and reporting relating to the balancing of the goals of
protecting the nation's waters and protecting human health and
life. Farmers had an opportunity to make their case as to the reasonableness of exempting additional pesticides and applications
during the notes and comments period. (R. at 6.) EPA considered
comments made regarding the expansion of the scope of the Pesticide Rule and, as a response, created a workgroup under the Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee to address the potential
implications of pesticide drift on the current Pesticide Rule. Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,488. In line with the court's requirement in Fed. Election Comm'n, the EPA has remained consistent
in excluding pesticide drift and pesticides used in violation of
FIFRA from the first interpretive statement through to the final
rule. (R. at 6-7.)
EPA's decision not to include pesticides outside of the scope
provided was based on the need for additional research into the
potential harmful impacts of pesticide residue and drift. EPA did
not wish to work against congressional intent to prohibit unsafe
applications of pesticides in FIFRA by condoning uses or applica-
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tions in violation of that act. (R. at 8.) As with the pesticides in
Fairhurst, the pesticides exempted from NPDES permitting by
the Pesticide Rule are intentionally applied (not residue, runoff, or
drift) and properly performing (consistent with FIFRA registration and regulations) and therefore are not "pollutants." (R. at 12.)
If this Court does determine either that EPA's action was unreasonable or that it was contrary to express congressional intent,
the Court should send the rule back to the agency for review.
Farmers are asking this court to declare that pesticides and pesticide applications other than those directly addressed by the rule
be exempted from NPDES permitting requirements. (R. at 2.) As
the court found in Chevron, there is a distinction between judging
the reasonableness of an agency's interpretation and the court interpreting the act on its own authority. If the current form of the
Pesticide Rule is exposing regulated parties to a hardship, the
Court's response should be to abolish the rule on its face or as it is
applied to the party, not to rewrite the rule to include the demands of the regulated party.
CONCLUSION
The procedural flaws in the Petitioners' claims preclude a decision on the merits in this case. Baykeepers lack standing and
Farmers' claim is not ripe. The district court's ruling should be
vacated because the case should have been brought directly in the
court of appeals. If this Court chooses to decide this case on its
merits despite these problems, this Court should rule in favor of
EPA by: (1) overturning the summary judgment for Baykeepers
entered in the lower court; and (2) finding Farmers' challenge to
be unsupported and void. EPA's construction of the Pesticide Rule
is based on a reasonable and permissible interpretation of the ambiguous term "pollutant" in the CWA, and the limited scope of the
rule reflects EPA's desire to ensure adequate protection of both
water quality and human health and life.
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